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Book Review_____________________________________________________________
LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD, edited by Julia Fionda. Portland, OR: Hart, 2001.

Scholars and practitioners in the field of child advocacy have long grappled with the
question of how our legal systems should regard children. Are children highly vulnerable
persons requiring extensive protection? Individuals who should be held accountable for their
actions? Rights-holders on the same level as adults? Partially developed moral and intellectual
beings? Some combination of all of these? Much recent legal scholarship in the United States
has focused on the closely related issue of the proper role of a child’s legal representative.1
Relatively little, however, has been written on the more general question of how the legal
system, as a whole, should regard children.2

Legal Concepts of Childhood, a collections of

essays by English practitioners and scholars in the areas of law and mental health, seeks to
provide an answer to that difficult and important question. While the collection, edited by Julia
Fionda, dramatically illustrates the vastly different ways children are treated depending on the
legal context, it does not in the end offer a central thesis on how children should be regarded.
The essays do, nevertheless, provide rich and thought-provoking perspectives on the differing
ways children are in fact treated. In addition, because Legal Concepts of Childhood focuses on
English legal philosophies and developments, it provides an important mechanism for scholars
and practitioners in the United States to compare our treatment of children with a similar, but far
from identical, legal culture.

1

See, e.g., JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND
PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 24-33 (1997); Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for
Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399, 1431 (1996).
2
But see Gary B. Melton & Brian L. Wilcox, Children’s Law: Toward a New Realism, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 3
(2001) (proposing a “psychological jurisprudence” as the appropriate method for developing law concerning
children).

Before beginning its examination of how children are regarded in different legal fora,
Legal Concepts opens with three chapters which discuss psychological, sociological and
philosophical perspectives on childhood. The chapter on psychological and psychiatric
perspectives, by psychiatrist Quentin Spender and psychologist Alexandra John, outlines the
emotional and intellectual development of children, the understanding of which is crucial to any
fully informed assessment of how children should be regarded by the legal system. Some might
find the subsequent chapters on sociological and philosophical concepts of children, as well as a
later chapter on literature’s portrayal of the child, impractical and esoteric, or at the very least
irrelevant in a book on legal concepts. If one can move beyond the expectation of a more legal
analysis, however, it can be remarkably refreshing to step outside of the usual legal discussions
and analyses of issues such as capacity, best interests, and rehabilitation and consider broader
conceptions of who children are. Chris Jenks’ chapter on Sociological and Media
Representations of Childhood, for example, proposes a fascinating new “taxonomy” on how
society perceives children.3 These chapters provide an important background to the chapters that
follow which, for the most part, analyze how children are perceived in various types of legal
proceedings including torts, housing law, education law, and social security law. While the later
essays are generally trenchant and thoughtful, of particular interest to lawyers for children are
pieces focusing on delinquency law, family law, and how children are treated in court.
Julia Fionda’s chapter on Youth and Justice provides an outline of the development of
delinquency law in England which is strikingly similar to its development in the United States.
In particular, Fionda highlights the disturbing trend to view children between the ages of ten and
fourteen as competent enough to bear full responsibility for their actions. Tied to this trend, of
Jenks proposed categories include the “socially developing” child, the “socially constructed” child, the “tribal”
child, the “minority group” child, and the “social structural” child. Chris Jenks, Sociological Perspectives and Media
Representations of Childhood, in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD at 33-42 (Julia Fionda, ed. 2001).
3

course, is the shift toward a more punitive treatment of adjudged delinquents, and away from a
more rehabilitative approach. As Fionda indicates, these shifts are tied to political motivations
rather than any sort of new research showing children are more competent at younger ages.
Perhaps Fionda can take some solace in the fact that, unlike in the United States, children in
England are not subject to the death penalty. While the trend Fionda describes in England is
surely disturbing, our Supreme Court has refused even to consider the issue of whether it is
appropriate to sentence children to death.
Allan Levy, in his chapter on Children in Court, describes recent progress in making the
courtroom experience both less traumatic for child witnesses and more fair to child defendants.
The developments show an increasing awareness that children need special protections when
they appear in court, whether as victims or defendants. Like courts in the United States, English
tribunals have become much more sensitive to the traumatic effects court appearances can have
on children, especially children who have been victims of violence who most testify against the
perpetrators. The English courts seem generally to make thoughtful efforts to minimize those
effects through such mechanisms as the use of video links and screens.
Most heartening, however, are the developments made in how children accused of crimes
are treated. Interestingly, the case which had the most profound effect was one in which the
ultimate ruling was made on appeal to the European Court of Human Court Rights, not to an
English court. In that case, two ten year-old boys abducted a two year-old toddler, beat him to
death, and left him on a railway track to be run over. The boys were tried, sitting on a raised
dock, in a courtroom packed with a hostile crowd. Before the trial, they were taken through the
courtroom, introduced to the procedures and people involved in a trial. They were also allowed
one ten-minute break per hour of trial to go to a play area with their parents. Although some

efforts were clearly made to make the experience more tolerable for the child defendants, the
European Court nevertheless found their right to a fair trial had been violated. The Court noted
particularly that because of the boys’ immaturity and disturbed emotional state, the hostility of
the crowd, and the public scrutiny, the boys were not able to participate effectively in their own
defense. Unlike the United States, England has an international court to which it must answer on
many basic questions of how children are treated in the courtroom, leading to a strikingly more
progressive approach. Levy notes that England is nevertheless far behind many European
countries on significant issues such as the age at which children are considered to have the
capacity to be criminally responsible for their actions. The United States – not bound by any
international tribunal or agreement – is, unfortunately, even further out of step with international
progress.
Michael Freeman’s chapter on The Child in Family Law illustrates that the United States
differs from England, and perhaps Europe in general, in its conceptualization of children and the
deference their wishes, as opposed to their “best interests,” should be given in the family court.
The English Children Act 1989, for example, not only provides children the standing to seek
residence with a person with whom they wish to live, it also specifically emphasizes the special
weight a child’s wishes and feelings should be given in court decisions. The cases described by
Freeman, however, seem to indicate that the English courts have been quite slow to account for
that special weight, illustrating how difficult it is, even for laws, to change ingrained attitudes.
While the comparison of how children are treated in the United States and England is
fascinating, some aspects of Legal Concepts are at times frustrating. For example, there is very
little done to tie together the various conceptions of children: should there only be one? Is the
fragmentary way children are perceived appropriate? Can the treatment of children in one type

of legal proceeding be instructive to practitioners from other disciplines? Perhaps, however,
these are questions beyond the scope of the book, and we should be grateful they are being raised
at all. This book can provide a broad outline of how our colleagues in England are approaching
the problem of how children should be treated by the legal systems in which they are
participants, and as such is a valuable and interesting read.

